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Abstract. This paper considers the problem of characterizing equilibria in markets 
involving n producers and a differentiated product. Each producer chooses a position in 
a set R taking into account the distribution of consumer ideals. Subsequently, an 
equilibrium is reached if no producer has incentive to unilaterally reposition. In this 
work, we consider the two extreme cases of this problem: In the first case, producers may 
be ignorant about consumer ideals and play conservatively by assuming a uniform distri- 
bution. We show that the rich class of equilibria that exists for this case can be 
narrowed down to a unique equilibrium when inequity considerations are taken into 
account. First, this involves showing that a so-called "minimal inequity equilibrium" is 
obtained via solution of a specially constructed nonlinear program. Subsequently, we 
display a unique closed form solution for this nonlinear program, which provides consider- 
able insight that cannot be obtained by usual numerical methods. On the other extreme, 
when complete knowledge of consumer preferences can be assumed, we consider an atomic 
distribution of ideals. Under such a distribution, we generate a new large class of 
equilibria. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The motivation for this paper comes from the 
following rather classical problem in multi- 
attribute economic decision making: When designing 
a new product, how does (or should) one select the 
so-called characteristic levels? For examole. 
before marketing a new brand of diet cola,'the 
oroducer decides on levels of artificial sweetener 
and caffeine. This decision is made in the face of 
existing brands, the possibility of other 
competitors entering the marketplace, the 
distribution of consumer ideals, etc. 
A number of papers on product positioning are 
concerned with the problem faced by a new entrant 
in the marketplace; e.g., see Cl]-[6] and their 
bibliographies. That is, given the position of the 
other producers, choose a set of product 
characteristics which optimizes a prescribed 
objective. For example, in Cl] and [7]-[9], this 
prescribed objective is market share while in [lo]- 
[12], profit maximization is the goal. 
In contrast to the references cited above, 
there are very few papers dealing with the issue of 
equilibrium; e.g., see [15]-[17]. Once all 
producers are positioned, a dynamic adjustment 
process may occur because some producers might 
increase their market share by repositioning their 
products; e.g., add more caffine. Within this 
framework, an equilibrium is reached when no 
producer has any incentive to unilaterally 
reposition; this, of course, is the classical Nash 
concept [13], [14]. 
A paradigm for the study of these problems has 
been provided earlier by Eaton and Lipsey [15]: A 
set of n players choose positions in a set n, by 
taking into account the distribution for consumer 
ideals. The mechanism for clearing the market is 
motivated by Hotellings' classical model for 
spatial duopoly [18]. Namely, if we abstract away 
from price in Hotelling's model, then each consumer 
selects the product which is positioned closest to 
her/his ideal,point. A multidimensional version of 
this product selection criterion is also used in a 
recent paper by Gavish, Horsky and Srikanth [I]. 
As far as Nash equilibria are concerned, Eaton 
and Lipsey have studied the questions of their 
existence and characterization when n is a subset 
of a euclidean space. In particular, when n is an 
interval in the reals, the distribution of consumer 
ideals is uniform, and n > 6. there exist 
infinitely many equilibria which "look" quite 
different from one another. In view of this 
nonuniqueness, one may ask the following 
question: Are there distinguished equilibria which 
result by imposing additional conditions on the 
behavior of producers? Such conditions are 
motivated by considering n producers evolving to a 
collaborative equilibrium by signalling to each 
other through their market behavior. In this 
paper, we provide a complete characterization of a 
unique equilibrium obtained by minimizing a certain 
measure of inequity. This measure is generated by 
computing the difference between the maximum and 
minimum market shares over all producers. 
The uniform distribution of consumer ideals 
constitutes one extreme of the spectrum. This 
situation might correspond to the case when 
producers are totally ignorant about the 
distribution of consumer ideals. On the opposite 
extreme of the spectrum is the atomic distribution 
of ideals. which may arise when producers have very 
detailed information about consumer preferences. 
In this paper, we provide sufficient conditions for 
the existence of equilibria for such distributions. 
The paper is organized as follows: In 
Sections II and III, we provide a formal game 
theoretic framework for the study of equilibria for 
locational choice problems on the real line. 
Subsequently, in Section IV. we provide a complete 
characterization of equilibria when consumer ideals 
are uniformly distributed over an interval. This 
characterization is instrumental to the problems of 
inequity minimization and uniqueness of equilibria 
studied in Section V. Section VI includes our 
results on the atomic distribution and concluding 
remarks are provided in Section VII. The proofs of 
our main results are relegated to the appendices 
which can be found in the full version of this 
paper [19]. 
664 
EQUILIBRIA IA LOCATIOML CEOICE PROBLEMS 665 
II. DEFINITION OF MARKET SHARE GAMES AND THEIR 
EQUILIBRIA 
We use N 4 {l 2 , ,...,n} (n>2) to denote the set 
of players and take n to be a subinterval- 
Zmepresenting the set of possible market 
positions. That is, each player ieN selects a 
n 
market position xi& and XSX 4 X n is used to 
i=l 
denote the n-tuple of positions (xI.x2,....xn). 
Finally, to complete our description of the model, 
we take I(') to be a finite measure defined on the 
collection of Lebesgue measureable subsets of R. 
This measure is used to represent the distribution 
of consumer ideal points over R. -~-- 
Remarks 2.1: Given the notational set-up 
above, we point out the obvious economic 
interpretation: The players are producers 
concerned with the problem of positioning a 
differentiated product. Given that price does not 
enter explicitly into the model, there are two 
possible points of view: In some cases, the 
product can be purchased in arbitrarily small units 
and we can view x.en on a "per unit" basis; e.g., 
consider the case'of coffee and let xi denote the 
caffeine levels of brand i per gram per dollar. In 
other cases, it may be reasonable to assume that 
all competing brands are clustered within a small 
price range. 
We also note that this model allows for the 
possibility of atomic (point mass) distributions. 
For example, if won represents miles per gallon 
per dollar, then it might be argued that consumers 
want as many miles per gallon per dollar as is 
technologically feasible. If n = [a,b] is viewed 
as a production possibility set, then one might 
model this situation using a measure I(‘) which 
concentrates all its mass at w = b. One can easily 
envision other situations where the measure assigns 
positive mass at only a finite number of distinct 
points in the interval [a,b]. 
Definition 2.2: Given any XEX and any i&N. we 
define the market segment attracted to Player i by 
Ai 4 {weR: (o-xi 1 < 10-xjl for all jeNl, 
and the market segment uniquely attracted to Player 
iby -~ 
-- 
ii(x) 4 (wen: /w-Xi 1 < Iw-xjl for all jeN. j#il. 
Similarly, the left and -market segments 
attracted to Playercre given respectively by - 
A;(X) = {wE$-~: o < Xi; osAi(X)) ; 
A;(X) = {W-i: w > Xi; ocAi(X)} . 
Furthermore, the left and right market segments 
uniquely attractednynamen by -- 
hi(X) = {U&t W < Xi ; lOCii( ; 
q(r) = {WEO: w > xj ; OCii (x)1. 
Remarks 2.3: For each icN, both A.(.) and 
i.(.) can be viewed as mappings of X i&o subsets 
? 0 n. To compute the "market share" of Player i 
resulting from a given xcX. we need to compute the 
total mass "attracted" to x. This quantity has 
two components: The first &mponent I(i.(x)) 
represents the total weight of cgnsumers'uniquely 
attracted to xi. Letting Ai(X)/Ai(X) [read 
A.(X) modulo Am] denote $he set of points 
iA hi(x), which are not in hi(x), the second 
component will 'be :I(Ai(X)/~i(X)) where 
I(Ai(X)/ii(X)) represents the total mass shared 
(equally) by players positioned at Xi and at 
another (neighboring) position. Once the total 
mass is computed, we divide this quantity by the 
number of players positioned at xi to obtain the 
market share of Player i. In an analogous manner, 
one can define right and left market shares of 
Player i. These notions are formalized in the two 
definitions below. 
Definition 2.4: Given any xcX and ~cn, we 
define the number of players positioned at w to be 
the cardinalityfthe of players%N such 
that xi = O; i.e., 
N(w,x) 4 card{icN: xi = w). 
Definition 2.5: Given any XEX and any ieN; we 
define the market share of Player i by ---- 
Mi(x) = 
I(ii(x)) +JI(Ai(x)/ii(x)) 
N(xi,x) . 
The left and ri ht market shares of Player i are -- 
given respective y by +- 
-- 
M;(x) = 
I(i;(X)) + ;I(A;(X)/i;(X)); 
NtXi 3X) 
M;(x) = 
I(bT(x)) + $I(At(X)/i;(X)) 
N(Xi 9x1 
. 
Remark 2.6: We note the obvious equality 
Mi(x) = M;(x) t M;(x). 
Using Definitions 2.2, 2.4 and 2.5 , it now becomes 
possible to give a formal definition of 
equilibrium. As indicated below, a vector of 
market positions defines an equilibrium if no 
player can improve market share by unilaterally 
repositioning. This, of course, is the :amiliar 
Nash concept [12]. 
Definition 2.7: Given a fixed vector of 
market positions XSX and any icN, we define a 
function M,(.,x): n+[O,m) by 
Mi(,.x) = Mi(xI,x2....xi_I.w,xi+I,...,xn). 
Remark 2.8: The function N.(w.x) above 
describes, as a function of.position. the market 
share which can be captured by Player i when all 
other players hold their positions fixed. We 
observe that Mi(xi,x) = Mi(x). 
Definition 2.9: A vector of market positions 
Remarks 2.10: The mathematical model des- 
cribed above differs from the model of [15] in one 
fundamental aspect: In contrast to [15] where 
producers are not permitted to produce identical 
products, here we allow for this possibility. This 
relaxation of hypothesis makes our definition of 
market share different from that given in [15]. 
This distinction leads to a totally different class 
of equilibria for the case of atomic distributions. 
There are other types of equilibria that one 
can consider in lieu of the equilibrium defined in 
Definition 2.9. For example! one could consider 
local equilibria by restricting w to a small 
neighborhood of xii. One could also consider a 
minimax type of eduilibrium as in [15]. In this 
paper we concentrate exclusively on global 
equilibria as introduced in Definition 2.9. 
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III. SOME PRELIMINARY NOTATIONS AND COMMENTS 
To aid in our investigation of equilibria, it 
will often be convenient to describe a player's 
position by locating an "x' on the interval R. For 
example, with R = [O,l], the diagram below depicts 
6 players, 3 of which are positioned at 0 = l/4. 2 
are positioned at w = l/2 and one is positioned 
at w = 2/3. 
#" P x 
2 ' 
. 
0 $ $3- 1 
Notice that if x*tX defines an equilibrium, then 
any 2 players can exchange positions and 
equilibrium will be retained. More generally, we 
can arbitrarily permute the entries x*,x*,...,x* of 
x* while preserving equilibrium. Thii n&ion is 
captured by the definition below. 
Definition 3.1: A given pair of vectors 
X,X'EX are said to be position equivalent if 
N(w,x) = N(W,x') for all WEQ. 
Remark 3.2: If x*cX defines an equilibrium, 
then there are at most+ n! - 1 vectors which can be 
paired with x* in position equivalence. Said 
another way, each equivalence class of vectors 
defining an equilibrium has at most n! members. 
Atomic Distributions 3.3: When I(') can be 
described by a finite number of atoms having 
~~~;~~;,d"l;,w~,,:'W9' we use a diagram of the sort 
n this example, there are 3 
masses and 5 players on R = [O,l] -- two on the 
left most mass at x1, one on each of the remaining 
masses at x2 and x3, and one at x4. 
b 
x1 x2 x3 x4 
Two and Three Player Case 3.4: A very simple 
characterization of equilibria is available when 
there are only two players. Indeeg, we_ cpn define 
the center of mass interval by n, - [w,,o,] where ---~ 
- h inffwm : 
wC 
I((-=,dnn) > + r(nb ; 
+A 
OC 
- sup{ocn : I(Cw.m)nn) > 3 I(Q)1 * 
Now, it can easily be verified that x*cX defines an 
equilibrium if and only if x%7 for i=1,2. Hence, 
for n=2, an equilibrium alwa$s gxists. To 
illustrate, consider the atomic distribution below. 
6 
47? $4 
.2 .3 .4 .8 .9 I 
Then n = [.4,.8] and any positioning of the two 
playerg in this interval defines an equilibrium. 
However, for the atomic distribution below, 
1 !z 9 
I! 
X 
0.2 0.4 0.7 ’ 
“6. 
= {0.4} is a sinyleton. Hence, there exists a 
u ique equilibrium, and the players necessarily 
have to pair up. 
t There may be less than n! -1 because, for some 
wcn, we may have N(w,x*) > 2; position exchanges 
between playens positioned at the same point will 
not yield a new equilibrium. 
As another illustration, consider the yniform 
distribution on [O.l]. In this case, w = o = -, 
leading to the unique equilibrium depicted selb. 
i 
0.5 I 
\ 
Note that in the framework of [15], the 
counterpart of this is indicated by the positioning 
diagram below. 
,6/2 6Dx 
015 I 
Here 6 > 0 is the minimum separation allowed. 
IV. UNIFORMLY DISTRIBUTED IDEALS 
We now turn our attention to a complete 
analysis of the situation when players treat 
consumer ideal points as uniformly distributed on 
some interval; without loss of generality, 
say n = [O,l]. Note that in this case, I(') 
corresponds to the classical Lebesgue measure m(') 
on CO.11. 
As discussed in the Introduction, this case 
was considered before in [15], under the additional 
restriction that players must occupy distinct 
positions. To explain this result, for a given 
configuration x, let 0 < 0 
denote the positions OF pla@/s';roi ;/?Ti :oWCight 
and take 6 > 0 as the minimum separation allowed 
between any two players. Then, it is shown in 
[15], that x* is an equilibrium if and only if the 
following two conditions are satisfied: 
(i) Mi(x*) > maxIMi( MJ(x*)l, jcN; 
(ii) wicl = tip + 6; $I = wt - 6. 
Without the restriction that the players' 
positions cannot coincide, the necessary and 
sufficient conditions for equilibrium become more 
involved, as presented below. We view the theorem 
to follow as a preliminary result which facilitates 
our analysis of inequity considerations in Section 
V. We first note that, in view of our discussion 
in the last section, there is a unique equilibrium 
when the numbers of players. n. is two, with both 
players positioning themselves at 0.5. When n = 3, 
however, it turns out that there is no Nash 
equilibrium, which is not difficult to see. Hence, 
we will concentrate in the, sequel on the character- 
ization of Nash equilibria for the cases n > 4. 
Theorem 4.1 (See Appendix A of [lg] for 
g;;,"-;;;,;f and only me following?onditions 
El. N(o;,x*) = N(wt,x*) = 2; 
E2. N(w,x*) < 2 for all WCCO,~]; -- 
E3. w*L = 1 - Ia?; 
E4. Wi+l = 3w;; uc_1 = SC - 2; 
E5. If x~[~~+I,~~_~] and N(x;,x*) = 1, then 
Mi(x*) < &IF*. Mf(x*) < W; and Mi(x*) > 0;; 
E6. If x~o[o;+~, ~t_~lancJ N(x;.x*) = 2 
for some icN, then Mi(x*) = Mt(x*) = wf. -- 
Remarks 4.2: Conditions El-E6 provide a 
recipe for the characterization of all possible 
equilibria. Roughly speaking, one "calibrates" the 
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position of all players in terms of u*. 
Subsequently, one can solve for tii. b( using the 
fact that 
L-l 
UF* + (yy) + z (WfCl - 07) = 1. (4.&l) 
i=F 
We also note that, under the appropriate interpre- 
tation, the statement of the theorem is valid even 
if n = 2 or 3. For example, when n = 2, El 
constrains w* = w*, and using E3, we obtain 
l/2, 
ME= 
leidinglto the unique equilibrium 
s lutlon derived earlier in Section III. 
Furthermore, when n = 3, El and E2 imply that no 
equilibrium exists. 
We now illustrate the construction of 
equilibria via Theorem 4.1. for n = 4,5,6,7. 
Examples 4.3: When n = 4, we can use El and 
E4 to obtain the diagram below. 
b 
Xx x” 
!+ L ?a$ *F=l 
Hence, a unique equilibrium results with W; 7 l/4. 
Similar reasoning for n = 5, leads to the unique 
equilibrium shown below. 
1 
P x K 
l/6 l/2 516 I 
For n = 6, Conditions E5 and E6 come into play to 
handle the fact that equilibria become highly 
nonunique. Using El-E6, we first obtain players 
positioned on intervals having lengths indicated 
below. 
Noting that E5 requires 0 < 6 c 2o;,,we generate a 
parameterization of all possible equilibria by 
writing 6 = 2aM*; Xc[O,l] and solving (4.2.1) 
l/(6+21) The resulting family of 
~~~i;~bria is shown below. 
; 
l/(6$2\) 
i 
5 
(3+2a),(6&) ' I 
XECO.11 
3/(6 21) (5121),(6+2x) 
Notice that when a = 0, the two single players 
merge into a "double" at w = l/2. Arguing in a 
similar manner for n = 7, we generate the equili- 
bria shown below, in terms of two parameters 
al and a2. 
E 
’ I 0 6+2(x1+x2) i ,,:‘:“,:,, ‘.. 3 
6+2(x1+x2) 
X 
. . . 
1 
3+2(x1+x2) 
6+2(x1+x25 
A1ta2 > 1 . 
V. MINIMAL INEQUITY EQUILIBRIA 
In many markets, a collaborative equilibrium 
may evolve because players can signal to each other 
through their market behavior. Consequently, it is 
of interest to know what type of equilibrium would 
be viewed as equitable by all players. For 
example, if all producers are approximately equal 
in "power," then we would expect a collaborative 
equilibrium to have the property that all producers 
receive approximately equal market share. This 
notion of "equalizing the payoffs" is captured in 
the definition below. 
Definition 5.1: Given a vector of positions 
xcX, we define the measure of inequity as ___-- 
E(x) i max Mi(x) - min Mi(x). 
i i 
Remark 5.2: Our objective in this section is 
to reconsider the case of the uniform distribution 
of ideals from the point of view of inequity mini- 
mization. As shown in the sequel, the imposition 
of a minimal inequity constraint forces the equi- 
librium to be unique. There are two cases to be 
examined: When n is even (the easy case), there is 
a unique equilibrium X*CX minimizing E(x), which in 
fact leads to E(x*) = 0; i.e., all players get 
equal payoffs. This equilibrium is generated by 
using Theorem 4.1 with 
N(w* 
ThiE yields an quilibrium wi fi 2 players located 
,x*) =N(wi+&,x*) =...=N(o; 1.x*) =N(w;,x*) =2. 
at each of the locations l/n,3/n,5/n,....(n-1)/n; 
each player icN receives a market share 
MI'"*) : l/n. When n is odd, however, the inequity 
m nlmlzlng equilibrium looks quite different; see 
the theorem below. Note that the theorem is stated 
for n > 7 because the equilibrium is unique (hence 
inequity minimizing) for n > 5. 
Theorem 5.3 (See Appendix 6 of [19] for 
proof): Suppose I(') is the Lebes ue measure 
onn = [Onand n>ns od. '-d,Vexists 
---- 
E(x*) = 2 
n2-2n-3 
(5.3.1) 
and x* 's uniquely determined by the positioning 
JZgram l- 
~-- 
***x 9; 
X X X P 
26F*F 2E*w* 2w* w* F F F I 
where 
m = $n-7) ; 
E* = l/(m+2) = 2/(n-3) ; 
tdf = l/(n+l) ; 
6* = 6* 
k n-6-k = 
t 
1 - ;(k+l)E* if k is odd ; 
($+1)c* if k is even ;(5.3.2) 
for k=l,2....,m. - 
Remarks 5.4: A number of features of the 
unique solution presented in the preceding theorem 
are worth discussing here. First, the unique 
inequity minimizing equilibrium dictates that inner 
positions be occupied by single players. Secondly, 
even though the spacing between single players is 
not equal, there is an interesting pattern which is 
captured by the following property of the 6;s: 
1+E*, k odd; 
6; + 6;+1 = 
( 1 , k even. 
Thirdly, since also 
1 
1+c*, m odd; 
c* + 6"1 = 1, 26; = 
1, m even; 
it follows from the positioning diagram in the 
t If n = 7 the position diagram is obtained by 
setting ali 6;'s equal to zero. 
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theorem that the market share obtained by each 
player is either U* or (l+o*)u*, with the 
difference E*W* = 
becomes large.F 
E(x*) going E o zero as n (odd) 
Furthermore, since also 6?:+1 for k 
odd and a?0 for k even, the players tend to l+air 
up" as n(odd) gets large, and the limiting solution 
looks nearly identical to that obtained for an even 
number of players; see Remark 5.2. 
Remark 5.5: The proof of the theorem, which 
is given in Appendix B of [19], is surprisingly 
nontrivial. We first show that for every inequity 
minimizing equilibrium, the inner occupied 
positions can only have single players. This leads 
to an expression for E(x) defined on an (n-5)- 
dimensional Euclidean space (see expression (8.2) 
in Appendix B of [19]). This function, which is 
neither convex nor differentiable, has to be 
minimized over a constraint set which does not 
satisfy any constraint qualification condition. 
Hence, the nonlinear programming problem to be 
solved is not of any standard type. It turns out, 
however, that it is possible to develop an indirect 
method of solution, leading to closed-form 
expression for the unique inequity minimizer x*oX. 
Example 5.6: To illustrate how Theorem 5.3 is 
applied, we consider the 13-player case: We first 
below 
X 
X X X X X X 
5/70 15/70 17/70 25/70 29/70 35/70 
X X X X !: 
41/70 45/70 53/70 55170 65170 I 
with E(x*) = l/70. Note that each player's market 
share is either 5/70 or 6/70. 
VI. ATOMIC DISTRIBUTIONS 
In some situations, consumer preferences may 
be well known and the distribution of consumer 
ideals might be representable using a purely atomic 
measure I('). This section considers the case 
obtained when there are a finite number of atoms 
having nonzero weights W ,W ,....W located at 
points wI,w~,...,w . Th!s being tile case, we can 
view the me sure Iye) as a collection of impulses 
a(. )wi) and use the symbolic representation 
(6.0.1) 
Without loss of generality, we assume that 
These equilibria might be appropriately termed 
"location invariant" because their existence 
depends only on the weights Wi; the locations 
0. can be arbitrary. To achieve this character- 
.J 1 ation, we consider the case when there are at 
least as many producers as atoms (n > p) and define 
the sets 
W. 
Y 4 (4 : i=1,2,...,p ; k=1,2,...,n-p+l) (6.0.2) 
and Y consisting of any n largest elements of U. 
In ca%?this set is nonunique, the construction to 
follow will result in multiple equilibria. Now, 
for each atom ie{i,2,...,p}, define 
ni 4 max{j : 'i 
J "Wmaxl (6.0.3) 
with the understanding that n. 4 0 whenever the set 
on the right hand side of (6.b.3) is empty; i.e., 
whenever Widoes not belong to Wmax. We can now 
generate a candidate equilibrium+ according to the 
following rule. 
Rule 6.1: For each ie{1,2,...,p) such that 
ni f 0, positionniplayers at w q oi. 
-- 
___- 
Examples 6.2: To illustrate the construction 
above, suppose S-I = [O,l], n = 6 and Wi.=,6-i for 
i=1,2,3,4. Then, given the set of positions 
oI,w~,w~,w~, we generate 
2 2 2 
y = Ii, 7~ 3, 
which leads to 
'mdx = 
;;d,;~,;,n' = 2, "3 
x* = x* 5 
1 2 ml; 
x* = 
3 
x* = 
4 w2; 
3 3 3 4 4 4 5 5 5 
1, 7% 3' 7 73 3, 1, I? 3 
r;, +, ;, ;, $3 +l. 
= n4 = 1. Now, using Rule 6.1, 
N(xi,x*) = N(x; .x*) = 2 ; 
N(xj,x*) = N(x;,x*) q 2 
seen 
x* = 
5 w3 ; N(xj,x*) = 1 ; 
x* = 
6 w4 ; N(x&x*) = 1 . 
For this case. our candidate equilibrium is 
indicated in the oositioninq diaqram below. 
5’ s 3- P‘ 
x” H x x 
w1 O2 *3 w4 I 
In fact, using Theorem 6.3 to follow, it is 
that our candidate x* does indeed define an 
equilibrium. _ 
To see that the metnoa of construction only 
yields a candidate, consider the situation 
when R = [O,l].n=3, W = 10, W = 8, W = 3 and 
(0 to. Then applicati& of Ru e 6.1 leads 
Fd the3posi&oning diagram below. 
3 
Ol *3 @2 
Kefact, 
equilibrium exists. This .pathology stems from the 
fact that the equilibria generated using Rule 6.1 
are "totally insensitive" to the players' 
positions. 
equilibrium. 
Only the weights Wi determine the 
For the example above, there will be 
an insensitivity to players' positions if 
0 (0 in which case the positioning 
d?agr% abode-d:es indeed define an equilibrium. 
Theorem 6.3 (See Appendix C of [19] for 
proof): Suppose I(') _issatomic measure on n as 
guarantees existenceran equilibrium: -- 
G n-l . (6.4.1) 
Moreover, whenever this condition is satisfied, 
Rule 6.1 definesnequilibrium ~*a. - -- 
Remark 6.4: The condition of the theorem 
requires that every atom has at least one producer 
positioned on it. 
treally a family of equilibria which are position 
equivalent; recall Definition 3.1. 
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VII. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
As noted in [15], equilibria are a "rarity" 
when the distribution of consumer ideals iS 
continuous but not uniform. To illustrate this 
point, one need only consider a piecewise uniform 
distribution of ideals. e.g., if m(') is the 
Legesgue measure on R 4 [O,l] and A is a measurable 
subset of n, define 
I(A) 4 m(Af\[O,$) + 2m(Arl(-$$)) + m(Arj[$l]) . 
Then it can easily be verified that equilibria 
exist for n = 2 (2 players at l/2) and n = 4 (2 
players at l/3 and 2 players at Z/3) but fail to 
exist for n = 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, etc. This example is 
not really pathological in any way. For most 
nonatomic measures which one tries, equilibria will 
be the exception rather than the rule. Recalling, 
however, that there is a rich class of equilibria 
in the purely atomic case, further studies might be 
aimed at improving upon the sufficient conditions 
in Theorem 6.3. Another possibility would be to 
consider alternative definitions of equilibria 
which may be more viable in the nonatomic case. 
Finally, we mention three other research areas 
which would be a natural outgrowth of the model and 
analysis given here. 
Multidimensional Characteristics: It is 
rather straiqhtforward to qeneralize the 
equilibrium definition given in this paper 10 the 
case when n is a subset of Re rather than R . In 
[15] a special case of this more general problem is 
considered under the restriction of 6-separation 
between the players. The authors argue that 
closed-form analysis is quite intractable, and 
moreover equilibria do not appear to exist for n>3. 
They support this conjecture by simulation studies 
when R is a disc in R and the distribution of 
ideals is uniform. It is, however, not clear how 
sensitive these conclusions are to changes in the 
topological structure of R and the distribution of 
ideals. Further investigations into the 
multidimensional case are required in order to 
develop a deeper understanding of this class of 
problems. Two starting points in such an 
investigation would, for example, be to change the 
"shape" of n to a square or a rectangle, and to 
consider atomic distributions of ideals; the 
possibility exists that the situation might change 
drastically under such a departure from the model 
adopted in [15]. 
Dynamics of Adjustment: The model developed 
in this paper is static; i.e., it does not include 
any sort of mechanism by which producers respond to 
their competitors. Hence, we cannot guarantee that 
the equilibria described herein will be generated 
dynamically when producers "jockey for position" in 
the marketplace. Said another way, are the 
equilibria which we obtain stable? Of course, the 
answer to this question depends critically on the 
postulated dynamics of product repositioning. It 
would be of interest to know what type of 
adjustment dynamics guarantee long run covergence 
of product positions to an equilibrium. 
Alternative Information Structures: Implicit 
in the equilibrium definition given here is the 
fact that players position simultaneously rather 
than sequentially. If instead, one considers a 
leader-follower type scenario, we obtain a new 
class of Stackelberg games whose equilibria may 
look substantially different from those studied 
here. In specific markets, other types. of 
information structures may also be of interest. 
Each of these problems constitutes an 
important challenging extension of the results 
presented in this paper. 
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